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This paper uses a contract theory model to argue that covenants ruling debt renegotiations are
important to assure the sovereign willingness to pay. The model includes the following features:
first, collective action clauses, exit consents, aggregation provisions and pari passu clauses play
an important role in the post default “game” of negotiations and coalitions. These covenants
are represented in reduced form by the endogenous probability of refinancing a defaulted
sovereign debt. Second, the model has “endogenous bad luck” because the unfavorable state of
nature where default occurs depends on the level of indebtedness, which is itself an endogenous
variable. Third, “vultures”, contrary to conventional wisdom, tend to improve the access of
emerging economies to capital markets because they might help to rule out strategic defaults.
And fourth, under special assumptions the model is able to analyze the possibility of post
default discrimination between domestic and foreign bondholders.
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I. Introduction
Several models of corporate finance have evaluated the standard debt contract
and derived second best results as a consequence of asymmetric information and
verification costs. Incentive constraints have been incorporated to rule out strategic
defaults and to assure debtor’s willingness to pay. Some of these models could be
extended to consider the case of a sovereign debt contract, but with several caveats
with respect to the possibility that sovereign debt contracts can have the same
effective legal mechanisms than private agents in case of financial distress. The
economic literature has analyzed the legal mechanisms of the debt contract
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emphasizing the events where most sovereign debt creditors were large commercial
banks. Collective action problems were limited by the relatively small number of
large creditors, the relative homogeneity of commercial bank creditors, and the
contractual provisions of syndicated loans containing strong pari passu clauses
promoting negotiated settlements. Creditors were represented by a steering
committee performing a number of functions, among them: resolution of
intercreditor problems, assessment of the acceptability of the offers made by the
sovereign, and the preservation of confidentiality (Krueger 2002).
The financial crisis of the 1980s induced modifications in bank regulations
(Basel Capital Accord Regulations) adjusting minimum capital requirements on
risky assets, and requiring higher capital adjustments in lending to sovereigns in
emerging economies. The new regulations moved commercial banks away as a
source of external finance for emerging economies, and commercial banks’
syndicated debt contracts were replaced by the debt contract of sovereign bonds.
There are a number of strands in the literature focusing on country risk and
sovereign debt. One strand proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Calvo (1989),
and  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) evaluated sovereign debt contracts with penalties.
These could be either the result of a potential loss of future access to capital
markets or trade sanctions, especially when affecting short term trade financing.
The identification of the form and the real size of the penalty affecting actual or
potential output has been reviewed by Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986). There
is no doubt, at the empirical level, that all defaults have been “penalized” by
significant output loss in at least one year following default.
Calvo and Kaminsky (1991) proposed an optimal contract model assuming that
bank syndicates and debtor countries entered into implicit debt contracts charging
a risk premium entertaining the possibility of a borrower’s default. Contrary to the
strand of literature emphasizing debt overhang, their model assumes full
coordination between banks and debtors in designing optimal contracts and debt
relief is consistent with full precommitment situations.
Another strand of research involves the role of the IMF. A recent paper by
Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2003) addresses some of these issues incorporating
the implicit IMF guarantee when acting as a lender of last resort, while Corsetti,
Guimares and Roubini (2003) proposed the IMF as a contingent liquidity assistance
provider to induce the sovereign to undertake costly reforms.
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literature, but with an ex ante explicit recognition of ex post bargaining coalitions
without IMF intervention. The highly stylized contract theory model developed
here will attempt to address these issues following a research line by Diamond
(1993), and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) –among several others in the corporate
finance literature– where debt contracts are determined by ex post bargaining
considerations. An important difference with respect to the related previous
literature on sovereign debt is the introduction of “endogenous bad luck” by
incorporating the level of indebtedness as an argument in the probability of an
adverse state of nature.
II. Legal provisions for sovereign debt
It has been argued that the absence of a “steering committee” representing
bondholders that provides for majority actions among a diverse set of creditors is
a primary source of difficulties. A sovereign that obtained the support of a qualified
majority of its creditors for a restructuring that could restore sustainability would
lack the ability to bind in a minority that may hope to free ride and continue to
receive their contracted payments. Individual creditors may consider that their
best interests would be served by trying to free ride in the hope of ultimately
receiving payments in line with their original contracts. Bratton (2004) illustrates
the free ride problem with the case of Elliot vs. Republic of Peru. Elliot, a “vulture
fund” specializing in obligations of distressed borrowers purchased US dollars
$20.7 million face amount of Peru’s 1983 debt at the discounted price of $11.4 from
two international banks at the time the restructuring negotiations were ongoing.
Elliot brought an action to enforce the debt at face value in the Southern District of
New York, a focal point venue in the emerging world of sovereign debt enforcement.
Elliot emerged from the Southern District with a judgment of $55.7 million. It was
thought that such judgment had value only to the extent the creditor could identify
property of the defaulting sovereign in the jurisdiction of the judgment or another
jurisdiction willing to levy execution; but that was not the case. Elliot relied on the
1983 debt contract’s pari passu clause, which provided as follows:
The obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least
pari passu in priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the
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When Peru was about to dispatch a large payment on its Brady bonds to
European holders via Euroclear, Elliot, in an ex parte proceeding, persuaded the
Belgian courts to block the payment on the ground that the pari passu clause gave
the holders of the 1983 debt the right to participate pro rata in Peru’s payments to
other foreign creditors. Peru, not wishing to default on its Brady bonds, paid Elliot
in full.
From the 1980s to the 1990s the debate on effective mechanisms to restructure
the debt of nations in financial distress did not emphasize the sovereign debt
contract and evolved in the direction of involving the official sector in generalized
bail-outs, but moral hazard considerations changed the directions of the debate
towards market oriented solutions involving the private sector in the open capital
markets. This new approach has not been widely acknowledged, and
representatives of the official sector in international organizations have permanently
complained about the reluctance of private lenders in accepting haircuts as a
necessary contribution to complement a package of limited official resources to
alleviate the financial conditions of distressed borrowers. Most of the time the
private sector would argue that the legal provisions of standard debt contracts are
needed to assure international lending to emerging economies
Legal provisions under the law of the state of New York that provide for
unanimous action clauses (UACs), requiring approval of a hundred per cent of
bondholders before any hair-cut is enacted, makes it difficult for bondholders to
provide relief to the sovereign issuer in times of liquidity crisis because just one
holdout may cause efforts to modify the payment obligations of a bond to fail.
Holdouts reflect both: the existence of agents with different perceptions regarding
debtor’s willingness to pay, as well as the existence of differences in litigation
technology. The case of Elliot in Peru, as well as several other examples of holdouts,
illustrates that vultures are significant players in most defaults because they seem
to be extremely efficient to contest in legal proceedings. In contrast, bondholders
are regular investors seeking stable returns through a diversified portfolio and are
not akin to vultures, which target defaulted exposures relying on the efficiency of
their own economic analysis as well as in their litigation and holdout ability. Vultures
are speculators in financial markets and perform similar functions as speculators in
commodities markets. Although severely criticized, vultures are willing to work at
the extremes providing liquidity to defaulted assets at the very time when everybody
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Also working at the extremes is the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
providing liquidity to countries in financial distress, and on the verge of loosing
access to capital markets. Curiously enough, many academicians seem more prone
to accept vultures as welfare enhancing but not the IMF.
There are two groups of critics of the IMF: on the one hand are those who
consider the IMF as not aggressive enough in providing liquidity, thinking that
financial distress is the result of weak aggregate demand and should be corrected
with more government spending, more borrowing, and fiscal expansion; on the
other hand are those considering that the IMF intervention implies a serious moral
hazard for the official sector, and in some instances improper liquidity assistance
helped to postpone structural reforms financing capital flights aggravating the
severity of the crisis. For this last group the IMF seems to act as a natural predator
to vultures, on the one hand providing liquidity when nobody would, except
vultures, and on the other hand urging sovereign bond issuers to modify their
contracts enabling easier restructurings through majority actions, or collective
action clauses (CACs), instead of unanimity clauses. Supposedly these
modifications would help the extinction of most vultures’ holdouts (Krueger 2002).
But sovereigns, investment funds, and some economic research argued that
sovereign immunity plus weak CACs could accelerate the extinction of both,
vultures and international private lending to emerging markets. The argument is
that UACs, and other contractual provisions affecting the probability of successful
renegotiation, enforce the debtor’s willingness to pay. Allowing partial coalitions
of bondholders to relax incentive constraints would weaken the willingness to
pay, jeopardizing international capital flows to emerging markets.
To evaluate the coalition possibilities, either in restructuring or in the post
default negotiations, it is necessary to understand some of the intricacies of the
legal provisions in debt contracts, in particular, it is important to review other
provisions denominated “exit consents”. These are other contractual clauses
covering matters such a negative pledges, governing law, submissions to
jurisdiction and listing provisions that can be used to circumvent the unanimity
requirement. Changing these clauses requires in some cases simple majority, in
other cases, it requires 66.66% of the outstanding bonds.
Choi and Gulati (2003) have evaluated a sample of 50 bond issuances governed
under New York law including samples of Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina and other
emerging markets economies and have found that exit consent offers several48  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
possibilities of strategic coalitions of players, some of these coalitions have already
facilitated the restructuring of Ecuador, and possibly will rule the post default
negotiations of most future defaults of sovereigns issuing bonds with UACs.
To illustrate, imagine the case of outstanding bonds having UACs covering
just payment dates for principal and interest, and the sovereign in financial distress
has managed to work out a coalition with a majority of domestic bondholders to
enact a restructuring deal. The government might use implicit side payments, for
example, allowing domestic commercial banks some creative accounting registering
bonds at nominal values instead of mark to market, which would implicitly reduce
the Basel capital requirement. Suppose that external bondholders in coalition with
vultures refuse to go along with an exchange bond deal because they have
expectations of a better deal. Exit consents could be used by the sovereign in
coalition with domestic bondholders prior to their exit from the old bonds.  Through
exit consents, domestic bondholders exchange their old bonds for the new
restructured bonds simultaneously consenting to changes in the terms of the old
bonds not covered under UAC provision. Through changes in the governing law,
listing provisions and other terms, the exit consent procedure can diminish
dramatically the value of the old bonds. Exit consent could change the governing
law from New York to that of the home country which could be less sympathetic to
holdout behavior and would make it harder for the holdouts to sue. Alternatively,
exit consent may be used to rescind the issuer’s waiver of sovereign immunity or
its consent to jurisdiction in New York1, both of which would complicate the
ability of holdouts to bring suit to enforce their rights under the old bond covenant.
Using the exit consent technique in August 2000, Ecuador was able to impose on
bondholders a 40% write off on a total debt of $6.5 billion for six different bonds.
The bond exchange concluded successfully, even with some vulture’s actions,
although Ecuador had to assume a market penalty, as it was unable for five years
to achieve a B-minus status from Standard & Poor’s rating agency.
After Ecuador, collective action clauses became more acceptable for financial
actors. Mexico was the first, in a series of other emerging market economies, to
1 Changing jurisdiction from New York to Argentina , dollar denominated bonds could be
converted to pesos, and immediately after conversion the government could devalue the
domestic currency. The Argentine Supreme Court judgment of April 5, 2005, declared
“constitutional” an Executive Decree during the default crisis of 2002 converting US dollar
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introduce in early 2003 collective action clauses in their New York law bonds.
Mexico’s bonds allowed 75% of holders of the bond to amend its financial terms.
Brazil included provisions that required the support of 85% of bondholders to
amend the bond’s financial terms, and has recently announced it will lower the
threshold to 75%. Uruguay went even further. After restructuring its debt (applying
the exit consent technique of Ecuador) Uruguay included aggregation clauses in
the new bonds.  The “aggregation” provision allows, at the discretion of the
issuer, the votes of the different bonds issued as part of Uruguay’s exchange to be
pooled. In the aggregated voting process the pooled votes of 85% of the outstanding
principal of all relevant bonds is binding on the holders of each bond, so long as
at least 67% of the holders of each individual bond issue also support the
restructuring (Roubini and Setser 2004).
UACs, CACs, “exit consents”, and “aggregate provisions” work jointly with
pari passu clauses. Bratton (2004) has done a penetrating analysis on pari passu
clauses and has identified two readings of the clauses: the broad reading and the
narrow reading. The broad reading is the Elliot judgment of the Belgian court in the
case of Peru, and has been the focus of strong criticism claiming that sovereign
debt contracts do not contemplate enforcement actions of the sort applied to
Euroclear. These critics also argue that compositions make the majority of
cooperative bondholders better off because they help to cure distress. Accordingly,
it would not be rational for bondholders to assent to debt contracts that held out
encouragements to opportunistic holdouts like Elliot. Contrariwise, the narrow
reading does not extend the right of payment asserted by the vultures. An “ultra
narrow” reading is the latest (January 2005) Argentinean proposal excluding from
any payment regular bondholders that would vote against the proposal. By April
2005 the “ultra narrow” reading excluded 24% of bondholders and the Argentinean
officials declared that the excluded bondholder would not be considered during
the present administration that is until 2007.2
2 Although this paper has been strongly motivated by the intent of modelling some aspects of
Argentina’s default (December 2001), we are unable at this stage to include a full evaluation of
events because the default is far from concluded. Until late 2005, the IMF (as well as the G7)
does not consider “normal” the outstanding Argentina’s debt until a solution is arrived with the
24% of bondholders that did not accept the bond exchange. It would seem that the international
community would not be willing to accept the “ultra narrow” reading of pari passu covenants
as interpreted by the Argentine government.50  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Modifications recently introduced in the Belgian Law would imply that the pari
passu interpretation for Peru will not be available for Argentina where the 76%
majority accepted a bond exchange with a hair cut of 65% on defaulted bonds
worth $81 billion in December 2001. On historical records this was a giant debt
swap involving 152 varieties of paper denominated in six currencies and governed
by eight jurisdictions. Although not necessarily through Belgian courts, litigation
should be forthcoming in the near future in several jurisdictions that will stress
test the language of debt contracts and legislation. And there is some evidence
suggesting that the prospect of such litigation will invariably undermine the
sovereign’s ability to reach a definite agreement with creditors, keeping open the
ongoing debate on sovereign debt restructuring.
III. The complete and incomplete debt contract
A simple method for analysing the government’s willingness to pay is to imagine
that a sovereign asks for a loan to a creditor promising to repay b, which represents
the nominal value of the sovereign bond at expiration date. The debtor owns k
liquid assets (with k<1) but needs to borrow 1- k. In addition, assume that the
creditor has the option of an alternative investment at a risk free rate r.
The sovereign, using its own and borrowed resources, generates an economic
and social environment that can produce a fiscal primary surplus, which is used to
repay the capital and interests on the amount borrowed.  This amount can be
produced in two periods in the following way: imagine the debtor’s country GDP
resulting from two sectors: the first sector is an agricultural sector where the
“crop” is collected in the first period, and the other sector is non-agricultural and
produces in the second period.3 Therefore the first period primary surplus is random
(because output is random), and the second period primary surplus is deterministic.
The idea is to reproduce a typical “external shock” of the sort affecting countries
where government revenues are dependent on some commodities like soybeans in
the case of Argentina or copper in Chile.  In a favorable state, the primary surplus
obtained in the first period is enough to pay the outstanding debt. In an unfavorable
3 This modeling for output has been developed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Dooley
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state, the first period primary surplus is not enough to pay the debt, and the
second period primary surplus is used to cancel the outstanding debt.
Suppose that the first period surplus, z, has a uniform distribution in the interval
[0; 2s]. Note that z is random with expected value, E[z], equal to s, but in the second
period is a predetermined variable of value s.4 If perfect information exists, and
both debtor and creditor are risk neutral, a debt contract is possible where, in
good states of nature, the creditor expects to receive an amount b, equal or higher
to (1-k)(1+r).
As z is uniformly distributed, if the realized primary surplus z exceeds the
nominal value of the bond b (as shown in Figure 1), a favorable state occurs.
Therefore, the probability of a favorable state is:  q(b)= (2s-b)/2s and the probability
of an unfavorable state is 1- q(b)=b/2s.5
4 The uncertainty of the first period output based on uniform distribution was analysed for the
case of a private firm by Romer (1996), following the theoretical framework proposed by Gale
and Hellwig (1985). Fernández (2003) extended the analysis to the case of a sovereign debt.
The fact that the expected primary surplus of the first period and deterministic surplus of the
second period are equal is unsubstantial.
5 In Bolton and Sharfstein (1996), Dooley (2000), and Dooley and Verma (2002) the state
probability is exogenous reflecting different kinds of shocks (as weather, or sudden stop of
capital inflows as in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002), while in this model the probability is
endogenous and depends on the nominal value of the bond. That is, the higher the level of
indebtedness, the higher the probability of an unfavorable state. A better assumption in dealing
with sovereign indebtedness.
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The simple example of a two sector economy –agricultural and non-agricultural–
can be taken to illustrate the sequence of events. At the beginning of the first
period (covering spring and summer), 1-k is borrowed from the creditor. This
amount is essential for buying seeds, fertilizers and other expenses for plowing
and harvesting. At the end of the first period and beginning of the second period
(covering fall and winter), the crop is collected and sold generating a primary
surplus z. With probability q(b), the primary surplus  is large enough to service the
debt. With probability 1-q(b) the surplus is not large enough to service the debt
and should be “renegotiated”. At the end of the second period a non-random s is
produced that can be used to service the debt in case that it was not paid at the end
of the first period.
Note that a “complete debt contract” could be arranged if it were possible to
issue a bond with clauses taking in consideration the different possible states. For
example, the contract might say “If the weather is favorable and a large crop can be
collected, the bond will be paid at the end of the summer, in any other case, it will
be paid at the end of the winter”. The problem is that, in many instances, there is
“costly state verification” (Townsend 1979), meaning that a state can be observed
but not verified in a court settlement. This generates “incomplete contracts”, where
clauses as described above cannot be found.
Incompleteness admits the possibility of the debtor’s unwillingness to pay;
even in a favorable state the sovereign could use the primary surplus in his own
benefit at the expense of the creditor. This means that if the debt is not paid, it can
be attributed to two reasons: liquidity crisis corresponding to an adverse state, or
strategic default corresponding to a favorable state and the debtor’s unwillingness
to pay.
A feasible contract should penalize a default, but it should also consider the
possibility of an adverse state.  In the context of this model, a default is penalized
by creditor’s action limiting the possibilities of the sovereign to fully take advantage
of the primary surplus at the end of the second period. Given the fact that the
default state is of public knowledge, creditors could take some executive actions
to jeopardize the primary surplus in the second semester.  These actions should
not be understood as the confiscation of assets held abroad that usually have
wide press coverage and a reputation effect for the sovereign. In our framework
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Stiglitz (1986) that are relevant only when the future always holds some possibility
of transfer in both directions, affecting real economic activity by suspension of
short term trade financing, or elimination of long run credit financing of capital
goods and intermediate inputs.
Taking in consideration the potential damage on output (or surplus) of such
actions, let’s consider that at the end of the first period the sovereign is unable to
pay and the contract is renegotiated. If renegotiation fails, with probability 1-p, the
primary surplus of the second period is zero. If renegotiation succeeds, with
probability p, the primary surplus is s, which is shared in equal parts between
debtor and creditor. The following decision tree illustrates the debtor’s expected
payoff under the assumption that the risk free interest rate is zero:
The value of p is crucial in defining the debtor’s willingness to pay. To accept
a debt contract, the creditor needs covenants to rule out a strategic default. It is
assumed that the choice variable p is a “reduced form” probabilistic representation
of explicit or implicit covenants such as UACs, CACs, exit consents, aggregation
provisions and pari passu clauses that rule the process of debt renegotiations in a
given jurisdiction. A high p implies a set of covenants in a contractual framework
and a jurisdiction where renegotiation is obtained with high probability, while a
low p implies a low probability to achieve a successful renegotiation. This choice
variable is necessary to enforce an incentive constraint (IC) to motivate the
willingness to pay as follows:
This expression means that the expected payoff when the debtor is willing to
pay must be at least equal to the expected payoff of a strategic default.
In addition to a willingness to pay constraint, there is a creditor constraint,
given that the creditor will not accept an expected value anything less than the
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alternative risk free investment. Therefore, the following creditor’s constraint (CC)










The first term is the expected payoff if the state is favorable; the second term is
the expected payoff when the state is unfavorable and the creditor receives half of
the second period surplus when negotiation is successful, and zero otherwise.
The last term represents the amount lent by the creditor. The constraint shows that
creditors expected payoff must be at least equal to lending the same amount, 1-k,
at a risk free (zero) interest rate.
The government wishes to maximize its expected revenue from the activity it
produces with its own and borrowed resources. The government’s objective
function (OF) is represented by:
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When the state is favorable, which occurs with probability (2s-b)/2s, the
government receives E[z|z³b]+s and pays the bond of value b; when the state is
unfavorable, which occurs with probability b/2s, a renegotiation lottery is enacted.
If renegotiation is successful, which occurs with probability p, the government
obtains E[z|z<b]+ps/2; if renegotiations fails, which occurs with probability (1-p),
the government obtains just E[z|z<b]. Note that the objective function does not
include the possibility of strategic behavior, which is ruled out by imposing the
willingness to pay constraint.
IV. Results for complete and incomplete debt contracts
A. The solution for the complete debt contract
The complete debt contract is possible if states are not costly to verify and
commitments can be legally enforced. This situation implies that the incentive
constraint (reflecting the debtor’s willingness to pay) is not required since a favorable
or unfavorable state can be verified at no cost; thus, the sovereign has no motivation
to deviate the surplus in the first period. The creditor’s constraint must be binding
(2)
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at the optimum, that is, the expected pay-off to the creditor cannot be greater than
a risk free investment. If this were not the case, the sovereign has the option of
searching for another creditor in a competitive market.
A complete debt contract reaches two first best solutions. As debtor and
creditor observe all the states, a default is not possible. The creditor collects b in
a favorable state or s/2 in an unfavorable state. Renegotiation never occurs, or
equivalently, p is always equal to one. Since the shape of the creditor’s constraint
is convex and the objective function is concave, there are three possibilities: a) the
curves do not touch each other, meaning that there is no solution, b) the curves are
tangent to each other, meaning a unique solution, and c) the curves intersect,
meaning that there are two solutions with two values corresponding to the
government’s bond. Without further considerations these last two solutions are
equilibrium solutions. The solution with a lower b has a higher probability of a
favorable state where the creditor is paid “normally”, while the solution with a
larger b has a higher probability of an unfavorable state where the creditor does
not obtain the full value of the nominal bond.  This is illustrated in Figure 2 which
reproduces the shapes of the curves OF and CC. Solutions for positive values of
b require (1-k)£(25/32)s. If this last expression holds as an strict equality, the
creditors constraint curve is tangent to the line p=1, and if the expression does not
hold at all it means that (1-k) is too high in relation to the ability to pay of the
debtor. When the CC curve does not intersect with p=1, it means that creditors are
denying market access to the debtor because he is pretending to borrow too much
in relation to his ability to pay.
Solutions exist for a range of parameter values. For example, for s=0.8 and
k=0.5, to p=1 correspond two solutions for b, 0.55 and 1.45, respectively. Both
solutions generate the same value of 1.10 for the objective function. As a probability
of a favorable state depends on b, a low level of indebtedness implies a high
probability of favorable state with debt being serviced at the end of the first
period. On the contrary, when indebtedness is high, there is a high probability of
an unfavorable state (“endogenous bad luck”) with debt being serviced in the
second period.6 Though not formally modeled for analytical simplicity, reputation
6 To illustrate a practical application of this conclusion, Argentina entered into default at the
end of the 80s and in 2001. In both cases debt to GDP ratio grew in previous years eventually
exceeding 40% (a ratio that could be considered fairly low for any country). This would suggest
a probability distribution enhancing the possibility of default when close to that ratio. Of
course, the uniform distribution for the surplus is not unsubstantial on this issue. A more56  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
considerations should induce the sovereign to obtain the solution with a higher
probability of a favorable state. This result resembles some of the analysis in the
literature where multiple equilibriums are discussed as a possible feature of emerging
economies.7
For simplicity this model has considered a single creditor, but in a competitive
capital market with several creditors, the highest value of b could be discarded
since the debtor will always find a creditor willing to receive a bond at the lower
nominal value minimizing the potential reputation effect of default.
realistic presentation should include the relative size of external shocks (such as sudden stops),
possibly in relation to GDP, as well as output loss due to the potential transmission of external
shocks to the exchange rate regime and domestic financial system. Although the highly stylized
model being used here would not allow to include in a simple way all these elements, there is no
doubt that the size of external shocks in relation to the size of the domestic economy should
be important in determining the optimal level of indebtedness. Avila (2000), Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Talvi (2002), and Ortiz and Rodríguez (2002) analyze the macroeconomic implications of
sudden stops and country risk on macroeconomic adjustment.
7 Calvo (2002) develops the argument that debt service and government expenditures are
financed with distortionary output taxes and there is a region where high and low growth
equilibria coexist. A “good” equilibrium implies low taxes sustaining high growth, while low
growth implies high taxes sustaining low growth. The policy implication is that International
Financial Institutions will help to coordinate the high growth equilibrium. In the context of this
model a sort of Maastrich restriction limiting the maximum indebtedness could help to achieve
the “good” equilibrium with a lower probability of an unfavourable state.
Figure 2. First best solution
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Graphically, the intersection of OF and CC shows the first best result for the
nominal value of the government bond b and the probability of a successful
renegotiation, that in the complete contract case is p=1. A comparative static
exercise when p=1 gives db/ds<0 for (1-k)(4/5)<b£s(5/4). This implies that if the
primary surplus is increased, CC moves leftwards, allowing the issue of a lower
value government bond. In a context of emerging markets, this would mean that an
increase of the primary surplus would reduce the country’s risk premium allowing
for a bond of lower value for the same amount of money borrowed. A higher
primary surplus and a lower nominal bond increase the probability of a favorable
state and decrease the probability of default.
B. The solution for the incomplete debt contract
As mentioned in Section III, when state verification is costly or there is no
possibility to verify the different states in a court settlement, an incomplete contract
has to be analysed giving place to a second best solution. This calls for the
inclusion of an incentive constraint (IC) assuring debtor’s willingness to pay to
avoid a strategic default.
The solution is obtained using restrictions (1), (2), and the objective function
(3). Note that, in the incomplete contract, the creditor’s constraint (2) is also binding
using the same argument as in the complete contract case.
The difference between this problem and the complete case is that now the
incentive constraint (1) plays an important role. As shown in Figure 3, when the IC
is added, a second best solution is located to the southeast of the first best (p=1)
indicating a lower value for the objective function, a higher value of the nominal
bond and a lower probability of a successful renegotiation. The added IC intersects
the creditor’s constraint at two values of b, but only the lower value is an optimum
as the objective function improves moving upwards.
They key element of the optimal contract is the probability of renegotiation
when first period surplus is not enough to repay the loan. The threat of failure in
renegotiation induces the sovereign to avoid keeping the first period surplus. If he
were to keep it, the sovereign renegotiates with probability of failure (1-p), and in
case of failure the second period payoff is 0, generating a lower total payoff to
what the debtor would have otherwise received if he had not opted for strategic58  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
default. That is, when first period surplus is in fact a value z equal or greater than
b, the sovereign will prefer a net payoff of z - b + s rather than z + ½ s. If first period
surplus were in fact z < b, a liquidity default is produced and renegotiation might
fail with probability (1-p). It is this last outcome that produces the welfare loss of
the incomplete contract.8
In Figure 3 we could show the problem of market access of emerging economies
imagining a situation where the incentive constraint and the creditors’ constraint
do not intersect each other. For example, for given values of s, we could draw a
creditors constraint with lower values of k (as would be the case of an
“undercapitalised” emerging economy) where the incentive constraint remains to
the left not crossing the creditors constraint at any point. Tangency of CC and IC
requires 1-k=(18/32)s, which is lower than the (25/32)s required in the complete
contract, implying that incompleteness reduces market access to sovereigns.
The simple two period dynamics of the model preclude us from deepening the
insight of special cases where a defaulted country affected with sudden stop and
Figure 3. Second best solution
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8 This result is frequently observed in the Principal-Agent literature. Normally, optimum contracts
are determined by ex-post bargaining considerations, a topic that has received considerable
attention in the corporate finance literature, for example, Diamond (1993). An excellent
presentation of the same point, but using legal language, can be found in Bratton (2004). WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACT 59
capital flight might end up with a reduced k (as would be the case of Argentina
after the 2001 default). The reduced k might imply that the country, after default,
needs to access financial and capital markets with an amount of indebtedness the
market would not accept. That is, with a reduced k the market expects a future debt
overhang and creditors would not lend. Fernandez-Ruiz (2000) developed an
interesting strand of research with a dynamic debt overhang model (asymmetric
information) where debt buybacks (for example, by privatisation of inefficient state
owned companies) might signal future efficiency gains by removal of distortions.
In the context of this model, a dynamic extension could use signals of that sort to
restore future values of k allowing the emerging economy to regain access to
capital markets. Of course a dynamic set up would not be independent of how the
emerging economy ends up after debt renegotiation or litigation after default.
V. Renegotiations after default
The previous model used two assumptions: first, a renegotiation game with
Nash bargaining, and second, a strong penalty in case of a failed renegotiation.
The failure of renegotiations at the end of the first period, which occurred with
probability (1-p), implied that the primary surplus of the second period vanished.
Now we will introduce a more realistic assumption contemplating the possibility
that, even in default, some primary surplus is obtained in the second period. To
include this possibility in the design of a debt contract we must consider the
possibility of litigation with the expected actions and decisions of sovereign,
bondholders, as well as outside buyers, or vultures. The vulture is defined as an
agent who has the financial and risk capacity to purchase deeply discounted debt
of a defaulted sovereign in the expectation of increasing its value. For the negotiation
game we will use the assumption of an n-person negotiation game in coalitional
form with side-payments, as originally developed by Lloyd Shapley (1951, 1953),
the Appendix giving a detailed presentation of most of the expressions used in the
text.
 In the previous model we had a negotiation game with just two persons (one
debtor and one creditor), and for simplicity the Nash solution was used, but the
same results could have also been obtained with a Shapley value function. In what
follows the Shapley framework facilitates the interpretation of the value of coalitions
that are frequent when contracts include collective action clauses. The Shapley-60  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Value is an a priori measure of what each player expects to obtain by participating
in a game. This value also shows what contribution each player can make when
they cooperate in a coalition, and it is expected that each participant will receive its
Shapley Value.
As in the previous model we assume that when the state is favorable, which
occurs with probability (2s-b)/2s, the government either receives E[z|z³b]+s and
pays the bond of value b; or behaves strategically asking for a renegotiation that
will succeed with probability p expecting to receive E[z|z³b]+Sq(s), with the creditor
expecting to receive Lq(s),  where Sq(s) and Lq(s), are the Shapley values for the
government and the creditor respectively. If renegotiation is unsuccessful, with
probability 1-p, the defaulted economy is able to produce a lower primary surplus
of s’< s and the government is expected to receive E[z|z³b]+ Sq(s’), and the creditor
Lq(s’). Notice that q is a sub index representing the state, s and s’ are functional
arguments also representing the stage of negotiations.
When the state is unfavorable, which occurs with probability b/2s, a
renegotiation game is enacted. If renegotiation is successful, which occurs with
probability p, the government obtains E[z|z<b]+S1-q(s), and the creditor L1-q (s); if
renegotiations fails, which occurs with probability 1-p, the second period surplus
is s’, and the government obtains  E[z|z<b]+S1-q(s’), and the creditor L1-q(s’). The
decision tree shows, separated by a semicolon, the expected payoff of sovereign
and creditor, respectively.
The difference between this decision tree and the one in the basic model is the
introduction of the Shapley values for each player in each negotiation game. The
new player in the game is the vulture, which, in contrast with the original bondholder,
is assumed to have a highly efficient legal technology that allows him to extract a
larger part of the second period surplus. Furthermore, it will be assumed that the
vulture bears no cost in negotiating and litigating and, in coalition with other
players, the maximum amount the vulture can recover from the second period is
Willingness to pay:                                                        [ | ]  ;  
(2 )/2 renegotiation succeeds ( ): ( )  ;   ( )
Unwillingness to pay:  { | }
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total surplus s’. Next we start analysing the simplest case of a post default
negotiation game with the sovereign, one bondholder and one vulture.
A. One creditor and one vulture
Without loosing any substance in the analysis, we will start assuming that the
creditor gets no value from keeping a defaulted bond; therefore he may decide to
sell it, or to form a coalition with a vulture to recover as much as he can.
Liquidity default: Suppose that the state is unfavourable, the first period primary
surplus is not large enough to pay the bond, and the sovereign defaults. If
renegotiation is successful, with probability p, the second period surplus is available
for a very simple Shapley coalition game: either the debtor joins the creditor or the
creditor joins the debtor. There are two possible coalitions each having the same
probability of 1/2, therefore the Shapley value for the debtor is S1-q(s)=(1/2)s and
the Shapley value for the creditor is L1-q(s)=(1/2)s. That is, the surplus will be
divided equally between debtor and creditor as in Nash bargaining. But if
renegotiation fails, the second period surplus is reduced to s’, litigation is a
possibility, and the vulture enters the game with a Shapley value (see Appendix) of
s’/6.9 The Shapley value for the bondholder’s expected profit in a liquidity default
after failed renegotiation is L1-q(s’)= s’(2/3). And the sovereign’s payoff when
renegotiation fails is S1-q(s’)=s’/6.
Strategic default: Suppose that the state is favorable and the sovereign defaults.
The cash surplus from the first period is enough to cancel the bond, but the
sovereign decides to default with the intention to use the available cash in its own
benefit, or to compete with the vulture in post-default negotiations. In the
renegotiation game there is no litigation, and the vulture does not enter the game.
There are two players, debtor and creditor, with Shapley Values  Sq (s)=s/2 and
Lq(s)=s/2. If renegotiation fails the vulture enters the game, and there are three
players with Sq(s’)= s’/6,  Lq(s’)=s’(2/3), and with the vulture’s Shapley Value denoted
by Vq(s’)=s’/6.
Therefore, on the one hand, the incentive constraint that motivates the
sovereign’s willingness to pay is:
9 Cost of litigating can be incurred by the vulture, and his participation in the game will depend
on his Shapley value in relation to expected costs.62  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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Sq (s)=s/2 ,   Sq (s’)=s’/6.
On the other hand, the creditor will include the expected liquidation value post-
default and will not accept a debt contract with lower expected value than an
alternative risk free investment as represented in the following creditor’s constraint:
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L1-q (s)=s/2, L1-q (s’)=s’(2/3)
The government’s objective function changes to
                                                                                                         (6)
S1-q(s)=s/2, S1-q(s’)=s’/6.
 When the contract takes in consideration expectations of post default
negotiations the solution changes, obtaining a lower value for the bond and higher
probability of a successful renegotiation.10 The sovereign also increases his payoff,
and all these results are due to the possibility of having a second period surplus.
The assumptions in the original model were that if renegotiation failed with
probability 1-p, the second period surplus was zero. This assumption seems to be
too strong when evaluating sovereign defaults. What frequently is observed is a
10 As the model presents multiple solutions the comparative static should be performed with the
economically reasonable solution, which is the solution with a bond with lower nominal value.
The existence of the solution is also sensitive to parameters values. Starting with an initial
position with parameter values of s = 0.98, and k = 0.5, the model including expected post-
default negotiations is equivalent to a comparative static exercise shifting s’ from s’ = 0 to
s’=0.80. With these parameter values, the optimal solution when s’ = 0 is b 0 = 0.511 and p0
=0.957, while the optimal solution when s’ = 0.80 is  b1 = 0.503 and p1 = 0.964 where the value
of the bond decreases, the probability of a successful renegotiation increases, and the value of
the objective function increases.
,
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short period of output loss (for example, Argentina’s rate of GDP growth fell by
12% in the year following default and became positive after that), and some market
transactions of defaulted debt with the expectations that debt value can be recovered
when the sovereign becomes normal again. Vulture’s participation contributes to a
positive liquidation value when renegotiation fails after a liquidity default. The
main reason is the assumption that the bondholder has no litigation ability. The
same result could be obtained with the bondholder hiring the services of a lawyer
and sharing the full liquidation value.
In comparing different countries going through the process of debt renegotiation
the potential output loss plays a very important role in ruling out strategic default.
Then, those countries that are very open in the capital account, providing financial
services to other countries (Uruguay, for example, is a net exporter of financial
services) might suffer a stronger output loss than countries that are not providing
international financial services (Perú, Ecuador, and Argentina) and would tend to
define contracts enhancing the probability of successful renegotiation.
In the case of strategic default the vulture’s participation is ex-ante, that is, at
the time of designing the contract, and not ex-post because the willingness to pay
constraint rules out strategic defaults. Perhaps this is the main reason why vultures
have such a bad reputation. They contribute to rule out strategic defaults and
nobody notices them, but, to be credible, they must prove their existence in liquidity
defaults when nobody wants them around, except bondholders out of cash.
B. One governing law, two managers and one vulture
Suppose an emerging economy issuing a bond under New York governing law.
Suppose that there is one investor holding 50% of his bonds in the domestic
country and the other 50% of the same bond in a foreign country.11 Therefore,
there are two types of claims on the sovereign: domestic and foreign. Suppose that
the investor has two independent portfolio managers (working at no cost to the
investor), one resident and the other non-resident. In case of default, both managers
11 This is a simplifying assumption to introduce a difference in jurisdiction during a litigation
process. The alternative assumption would be to consider two totally different bondholders,
one resident and one non resident. This assumption would require two creditors’ constraints,
increasing the complexity of the solutions.64  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
are left with a claim with zero value. If the vulture participates in the post-default
negotiation in coalition with the managers they extract a surplus, s’<s.
There are now four potential players in the negotiation game: two managers,
the vulture and the sovereign. In the first stage there is renegotiation without
litigation, and the vulture does not intervene. Therefore, possible coalitions include
the debtor with the two managers. The debtor with just one manager obtains 50%
of voting power, and even with collective action clauses it is not enough to strike
a deal requiring a 51% majority, therefore the value of this coalition is zero. The
debtor with both managers obtains 100%, and the value of the coalition is the full
surplus s. In this first stage of negotiation the coalitional game structure is the
same in the favourable state than in the unfavourable state because the vulture
does not intervene. The specific Shapley Values are: Lq(s)=L1-q(s)=s(2/3), and
Sq(s)=S1-q (s)=s/3.
If first stage fails, a second stage negotiation starts where: a) there is litigation,
b) there is a surplus loss with s’<s, and c), the vulture enters the game affecting the
value of coalitions. It will be assumed that the coalition of the vulture or the
sovereign with the foreign manager receives g s’ (0<g £ 1) from the second period
surplus, while the coalition between the vulture and domestic creditor, or between
the sovereign and the domestic creditor obtains ag s’, 0£a £ 1. These assumptions
can be rationalized on the basis of the following considerations. As mentioned at
the outset, if CACs are not available, “exit consents” create the possibility that
sovereigns might form a coalition with domestic residents to modify covenants
not requiring UACs. There is also the possibility that domestic managers could be
“persuaded” by the government not to take an aggressive litigation stance in case
of default. In this case domestic managers, either in coalition with the government
or with a vulture, might accept a lower recovery value.12
The parameter a, can be set equal to 1 when domestic and foreign creditor can
12 Discrimination between domestic and foreign bondholders could be either way. This can be
illustrated in the following quotation from a politician:  “Repaying Argentina’s debts, he has
said, means “paying with the sweat and toil of the people”. Foreign bondholders don’t vote, and
politicians are reluctant to repay them with the sweat and toil of the people who do.” Published
by The Economist, February 19 2004, “The End of the Affair?”.
 Tirole (2002) (see also Fischer 2004) deals with a similar topic focusing on international
capital flows and a dual-agency problem. The dual agents are the emerging-country private
borrower and the government of the country. For private capital flows, the lender contracts
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extract from the debtor the same amount (in legal terms this corresponds to a broad
reading of the pari passu covenant), but a can be less than 1 when there are
independent managers acting in different environments and jurisdictions. It is also
assumed that the coalition of the two managers with the sovereign receive s’.
 Two assumptions are analysed: first, the Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
assumption of liquidity default where the sovereign is strongly cash restricted and
unable to join a coalition game if renegotiations fails. Second, the sovereign is able
to join coalitions after failed renegotiations.
First case: The illiquid sovereign is unable to join post default coalitions
Suppose that the state is unfavourable and the country defaults. If renegotiation
fails, the vulture enters the game, and s’ will be divided according to their Shapley
Values. Now, L1-q(s’) will be the sum of both managers Shapley Values. It can be
shown that this equals to:
L1-q(s’)=s’(2/3) -g s’(1+a)/6.
The vulture’s Shapley Value V1-q is
V1-q =s’/3+g s’(1+a)/6.
The Shapley Value of the sovereign is zero, S1-q (s’)=0, because it is assumed
that the sovereign does not have enough cash to compete with the vulture and
does not enter the game. Notice that the sum of Shapley Values corresponding to
each player adds up to s’. Also notice that the managers’ Shapley Value depends
financed. But the outcome of the project is also affected by the actions of the host-country
government. Ex ante, the government promotes capital inflows. But ex post the government
promotes the interests of the borrowers at the expense of the lenders.
 Another example of discrimination is the case of Argentina mentioned at the outset, where a
Supreme Court judgment of April 5, 2005, declared “constitutional” an Executive Decree
converting US dollar denominated bonds to pesos. This implied that, immediately after the
peso devaluation (300%, beginning of 2002), the dollar value of bonds converted to pesos was
reduced to one fourth. In the comparative static exercise it is assumed that the local manager
can be discriminated against, but the same result could be obtained if the foreign manager is the
one discriminated. What matters is discrimination, not against whom.66  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
negatively on g and a while the vulture’s Shapley Value depends positively on
those parameters. Consequently, discrimination against the local managers with a
lower a implies that the vulture receives less and the bondholder receives more,
the reason is that the foreign manager captures the loss of the local manager plus
the loss of the vulture. That is, discrimination against the local manager with a
reduced value of a implies that the local manager receives less, but the sum of both
managers Shapley Value increases.
 Suppose now that the state is favorable but the sovereign defaults. As
mentioned above, in the first stage of renegotiation without litigation the vulture
does not play the game, and Lq(s)=s(2/3), and Sq(s)=s/3. If renegotiation fails, the
vulture enters, and there are four players. Each player receives its Shapley Value,
and Sq (s’)=s’/12+g s’(a+1) /12.
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If the government falls into a liquidity default, second period surplus s’ is
divided between the vulture and both managers according to their Shapley Value,
whereas the government receives zero.
Contract design includes a willingness to pay constraint ruling out the
possibility of strategic behaviour by the sovereign. This means that the sovereign
will always be better off honouring the bond in a favourable state than playing the
(7)
(8)
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game of a strategic default. Again, the existence of the vulture is a priori speculation
in a strategic default and a sure thing in a liquidity crisis.
Another conclusion is that, if the domestic portfolio manager can be
discriminated against in post-default negotiations, the sovereign could issue
contracts with lower nominal values for bonds and a higher probability of
renegotiation. This seems a controversial result but can be illustrated with a
comparative static exercise. Discrimination against the local manager implies a
lower value for a: graphically, this could be interpreted as the willingness to pay
constraint shifting upwards while the creditor’s constraint shifts leftwards.
The explanation is as follows. When the local manager is discriminated (a reduced)
the Shapley Value of the bondholder represented by both: the local and the foreign
managers, increases, while the Shapley Value of the vulture is reduced. As more of
the second period surplus is expected to be received by the bondholder, the nominal
value is reduced and the bond has a higher probability of a successful renegotiation.
This result depends upon the assumption of one bondholder and two managers.
The local manager litigates “inefficiently”, either in coalition with the sovereign or
in coalition with the vulture, reducing his own payoff and vulture’s payoff in
benefit of the foreign manager. If instead of two managers we had two bondholders
(one local and one foreigner) to produce similar results we would need effective
capital controls to allow for discrimination against the local bondholder. That is,
the foreign bondholder, ex-ante, would not accept a contract yielding less than the
risk free interest rate, while the discriminated local bondholder, under capital controls,
might not have access to risk free instruments.
Second case: The illiquid sovereign joins post default coalitions
If the sovereign is able to participate in post default negotiations Shapley
Values changes improving the previous solution moving the equilibrium points
(graphically) northwest with a lower nominal value for the bond and a higher
probability of a successful renegotiation, this, of course at the expense of the
vulture. Again, discrimination against the local manager implies a lower value for
a: the willingness to pay constraint shifts upward and the creditor’s constraint
shifts leftwards. The explanation is as above. When one of the managers is
discriminated (a reduced) the Shapley Value of the bondholder represented by68  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
both the local and the foreign manager increases, while the Shapley Value of the
vulture is reduced.
VI. Conclusions
The application of contract theory that we have developed in this paper indicates
that several controversial issues of what has been denominated as a new
international financial architecture to handle sovereign debt can be analyzed in a
framework of standard economic theory. With reasonable assumptions it is possible
to address topics that economists have not paid too much attention but are at the
heart of day-to-day contract design of bond issues for emerging economies.
Governing law, UACs, CACs, exit consents, and litigation procedures are
fundamental aspects that are permanently ignored except at the time of restructuring
a defaulted sovereign debt.
As the model presented in the preceding sections indicates, post default
renegotiations are important elements to be taken in consideration at the time of
contract design. The analysis performed so far indicates that the flow of capital
funds, badly needed by emerging economies, could be jeopardized if renegotiations
are considered to be just a problem of how to handle vultures or how to find a
“statutory” reform of financial institutions. Ignoring the fundamental reasons why
contracts are the way they are will not help the international capital markets. Paying
attention to topics so far exclusively monopolized by professional lawyers
specialized in sovereign debt could enrich the understanding of a better financial
architecture.
Ignoring the role of incentive constraints assuring the willingness to pay in
sovereign’s debt contracts might be beneficial at the time of a liquidity crisis but
will promote strategic defaults increasing the uncertainty and the long run stability
of emerging capital markets.
Governing law is an important element to be considered, as well as the
distribution of debt in local and foreign markets, subject to one jurisdiction. The
analysis performed so far indicates that post default coalitions to renegotiate debt
contracts are important in determining ex-ante the nature of the contract and a
fundamental requirement in covenants assuring a transparent and economically
efficient access to markets. WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACT 69
All this analysis suggests that a better approach to a new financial architecture
is perhaps to deepen the understanding of debt contracts, governing law, and the
working of post default coalitions, including vultures. Some of these fundamental
issues in debt contract design were taken in consideration in proposals for a
statutory approach involving the IMF (for example, Krueger 2002) in crisis
resolution. This paper argues that another promising approach would be to define
international standards for UACs, CACs, governing law, jurisdiction, and exit
consents. A limited role of the IMF as a lender of last resort or connected lending
conditioned on improving information and legal imperfections in emerging
economies is a possible extension to the present model that would require additional
research. A straightforward conjecture is to think the lender of last resort
participation as a lump sum transfer moving the distribution of z to the right,
decreasing the probability of an unfavorable state. However, when these or other
actions are included in the analysis, moral hazard, and the sovereign’s strategic
behavior should be restated to assure willingness to pay.
Appendix
A. Shapley values
The Shapley Value measures the “value” of each player in an “n-person games
in coalitional form with side payments”. For our purposes a very simple framework
can be presented as follows.
There is a set N of actors and a function v that associates to every subset S of
N, where v(S) is a real number and represents the maximum value of the coalition.
The Shapley Value v of player i is exactly the expected marginal contribution of
the player i to a random coalition S. For a coalition S not containing i, the marginal
contribution of i to S is the change in the worth when i joins S, i.e., v(S U{i})–v(S).
A random coalition S not containing i is obtained by arranging all n players in line
(e.g. 1, 2… n), and then putting in S all those that precede i; it is assumed that all n!
orders are equally likely.
The Shapley Value has several desirable properties and the amount the actor i
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where n is the total number of actors and the sum extends over all subsets S of N
not containing actor i. |S| represents the number of elements in S. The applications
of Shapley Value in the preceding sections of the paper were developed first for
three players and then for four players as follows.
B. Three-person game: Creditor, debtor and vulture
If a represents the creditor (or bondholder), b the vulture and d the sovereign
(or debtor country), the possible (n!=3!=6) coalitions are: abd, adb, bad, bda, dab,
dba. Each coalition is equally likely with probability of 1/6.
The Shapley Value for the creditor a, fa: The random coalitions are formed with
all the elements that precede a in the possible coalitions defining elements in S. When
there are no elements preceding a there is an empty coalition denoted by Æ.
Therefore:
- Possible coalitions: abd, adb, bad, bda, dab, dba;
- Elements that precede a: Æ,  Æ  , b , bd , d , db.
The Shapley Value fa is computed from the second column of Table A1, where
only one empty coalition is reported to save space (the same criterion applies to
the following tables), whence fa=(1/6)[v(ab)-v(b)]+(1/6)[v(ad)-v(d)]+(2/6)[v(abd)-
v(bd)]. The contribution of i to a coalition S is described as v(S U{i})–v(S), and
displayed at the right of each coalition.
For example, the marginal contribution of a to the coalition with elements (bd)
is calculated as follows: v[(bd)U{a}]–v(bd)=s’–0=s’, since the vulture and the
sovereign do not get anything by themselves, v(bd)=0, but when a gets into the
Table A1. Marginal contributions for three-person game
            Creditor (a)                                 Vulture (b)                                Sovereign (d)
Coalition Marginal contribution Coalition Marginal contribution Coalition Marginal contribution
Æ 0 Æ 0 Æ 0
bs ’as ’ a s ’
ds ’d0 b 0
bd s’ ad 0 ab 0
db s’ da 0 ba 0 WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CONTRACT 71
coalition they get s’. Notice that empty coalitions have no value and the last term
includes coalitions abd and adb which are weighted (2/6), so fa=(1/6)[s’]+(1/6)[s’]
+(2/6)[s’]= 1/6 [4s’]=s’(2/3).
The Shapley Value for the vulture b, fb : all the elements that precede b define
S, representing the possible coalitions. The fourth column of Table A1 shows the
marginal contribution of b: fb= (1/6) [ s’]=s’/6.
The Shapley Value for the Sovereign (debtor country) d, fd : all the elements
that precede d define S, representing the possible coalitions. The sixth column
shows the marginal contribution of d: fd= 1/6 [ s’]=s’/6.
It can be easily verified that the sum of Shapley Values for all players adds to s’.
C. Four-person game: Two managers, debtor, and vulture
First stage: Renegotiation game, the vulture does not play
The parties to the coalition are: the local manager a, the foreign manager c, and
the debtor sovereign d. The possible coalitions are: acd,  adc,  cad,  cda,   dac,
dca.
Table A2. Marginal contribution for four-person game, vulture does not play
                             Manager (a)                                                         Manager (c)
Coalition Marginal contribution Coalition Marginal contribution
Æ 0 Æ 0
c 0 a 0
d 0 d 0
cd s ad s
dc s da s
Shapley value for manager a:  fa=s/3.
Shapley value for manager c: fc=s/3.
Then, fa+ fc = Lq(s) =s(2/3), given that s = fa+ fc + fd ,  Sq(s)=fd=s/3.
Liquidity default: Sovereign does not play in post default coalitions
The parties to the coalition are: the manager a (managing assets in the domestic72  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
jurisdiction), the manager c (managing assets in the foreign jurisdiction) and the
vulture b.  The possible coalitions are equally likely with probability 1/6: abc,   acb,
bac,   cab,   bca,   cba.
Table A3. Marginal contribution for four-person game, sovereign does not play
          Manager (a)                                 Manager (c)                                  Vulture (b)
Coalition Marginal contribution Coalition Marginal contribution Coalition Marginal contribution
Æ 0 Æ 0 Æ 0
b ags’ a 0 a ags’
c0b g s’ c gs’
bc s’ - gs’ ab s’-ags’ ac s’
cb s’ - gs’ ba s’-ags’ ca s’
Shapley Value for manager a: fa=[ag s’+ 2(s’-gs’)]/6=s’/3–gs’(2-a) /6.
Shapley Value for manager c: fc= [2(s’-ags’)+g s’)]/6 =s’/3–g s’(2a -1) /6.
Shapley Value for the vulture b: fb=[ag s’+g s’+2s’)] /6=s’/3+g s’(a +1) /6.
The comparative static of Shapley Values indicates that an increase in a
increases the Shapley Value of the Vulture and decreases the sum of Shapley
Values of managers, that is fa+ fc = L1-q = s’(2/3) –g s’(1+a)/6.
Comparative static of changing a: d(fa+ fc )=dL1-q=(–gs’/6)da, dfb =(gs’/6)da .
Consequently, if the sovereign could discriminate against the local managers
reducing a, the vulture receives less and the bondholder receives more, the reason
is that the foreign manager captures the loss of the local manager plus the loss of
the vulture.
Strategic default
There are now 4 parties to the coalition: the manager a, the manager c, the
sovereign d, and the vulture b. The following coalitions are equally likely with
probability 1/24: abcd,  bacd,  cabd,  dabc, abdc, badc, cadb, dacb, acbd, bcad,
cbad, dbac, acdb, bcda, cbda, dbca, adbc, bdac, cdab, dcab, adcb, bdca, cdba,
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Table A4 computes the marginal contributions to determine the four-player
game Shapley values as follows:
Shapley Value for the manager a: fa= [6 (ags’)+ 10(s’-gs’)] /24;
Shapley Value  for the manager c: fc= [10 (s’-ags’)+ 6(gs’)] /24;
Shapley Value  for the vulture b: fb= [2 (ags’)+ 2(gs’) + 2s’] /24;
Shapley Value  for the debtor country d: fd= Sq (s’)=  [2 (ags’)+ 2(gs’) + 2s’] /24.
Table A4. Marginal contribution for four-person game, strategic default
         Manager (a)                     Manager (c)                     Vulture                         Sovereign
Coalition Marginal Coalition Marginal Coalition Marginal Coalition Marginal
contribution contribution contribution contribution
Æ 0 Æ 0 Æ 0 Æ 0
b ags’ a 0 a ags’ a ags’
b ags’ a 0 a ags’ a ags’
c0b g s’ c s’g b 0
c0b g s’ c s’g b 0
d ags’ d gs’ d 0 c g’s
d ags’ d gs’ d 0 c g’s
bc s’-gs’ ab s’-ags’ ac s’ ab 0
bd ags’ ad s’-ags’ ad 0 ba 0
cb s’-gs’ ba s’-ags’ ca s’ ac s’
cd s’-gs’ bd gs’ cd 0 ca s’
db ags’ da s’-ags’ da 0 bc 0
dc s’-gs’ db gs’ dc 0 cb 0
bcd s’-gs’ abd s’-ags’ acd 0 abc 0
bdc s’-gs’ adb s’-ags’ adc 0 acb 0
cbd s’-gs’ bad s’-ags’ cad 0 bac 0
cdb s’-gs’ bda s’-ags’ cda 0 bca 0
dbc s’-gs’ dab s’-ags’ dac 0 cab 0
dcb s’-gs’ dba s’-ags’ dca 0 cba 0
Liquidity default: Sovereign plays in post default coalitions
This is similar to the strategic default, there are 4 parties to the coalition: the74  JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
manager a, the manager c, the sovereign d, and the vulture b have the following
values:
fd =S1-q (s’) = [g s’(1+a) + s’] /12;
(fa+fc)= L1-q(s’) =[5s’-gs’(1+a)]/6;
fb =[(ags’)+ (gs’) + s’] /12.
The solution to the problem of the illiquid sovereign playing post default
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A comparative static exercise changing a, gives dS1-q(s’)/da>0, dL1-q(s’)/da<0,
and dfb /da>0.
Solving the optimisation problem with parameters values k=0.5, s=0.85, s’=0.5,
g =0.9, and a=0.5 gives a result with OF=1.079, b=0.621 and p=0.706. Reducing the
value of a to a=0.4 gives a result with OF=1.080, b=0.620 and p=0.719, which
graphically implies that the solution moves to the northwest as mentioned in text.
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